Bullets and Beans (Part One)

In 1940, the French surrendered to the Germans, giving the Nazi control of the French colonies of Syria and Lebanon. The poison spread quickly through the region including some very deep roots into neighboring Iraq. A localize version of the Nazi and Fascist parties was founded, one which continued to operate beyond the fall of the Third Reich—the Baath Party, the same Baath Party that exists today.

Amidst all the personal agendas and private biases, history and common sense seem to have been among the first intellectual casualties of the war. With pundits trying to steer military strategy, it seems a time to put some perspective on the obvious.

Each force in an army exerts a zone of influence. This area is not the territory it controls but the area it affects. Imagine you wish to travel from one end of a street to the other. If you are alone, only your own ability and the physical layout of the street influences your progress. If I am also on this street and wish to prevent you from reaching your goal, I can only affect a small portion of your trek. By myself, I can affect only a few feet around me. As you approach, we would begin movements to intervene and evade when we are still yards apart. This is a simplified example of a zone of influence. We are able to affect each other when we are in proximity but not specifically engaged. Once we are with each other’s zone of influence, neither of us can move with impunity. Add guns or other weapons to extend our range and it is easy to see how we may both end up in a prolonged stand-off.

This is very common on the battlefield. Minor adjustments can be made, but once two forces enter each other’s zone of influence, both become effectively pinned in place until one or both of the commanders are prepared to either directly engage or risk counter-attack while moving out of range. Once a force has been pinned, its maneuverability is restricted; if the force is overmatched, it is pragmatically fixed in place on the battlefield. Considering the risks and difficulties of moving against a positioned force, less force is needed to fix an army than to engage it. Fixing a defensive army with a smaller, better provisioned force is a tactic as old as war itself. It is the underlying premise of siege warfare.

If I were to lead a powerful invading force, I would face a key decision when I encountered the first enemy entrenchment, or hard point. I could engage the point directly, but due to the enemy’s preparations and preferential positioning, I would suffer disproportionate casualties. Anyone familiar with the medieval analogy of charging a castle can see the disadvantages of this approach.

My second option would be to besiege the fortifications in the traditional manner: cut them off from resupply and harry them at range until they are sufficiently degraded to engage them directly. Against an enemy with multiple mobile forces, this tactic is a two-edged sword. The enemy could move forward from other positions and bring an attack on my stationary flanks, pinning me between his two forces. By concentrating on this single point, I make myself vulnerable and lose one of my own best advantages, maneuverability.

Remember it takes less force to fix than conquer. A better option is to leave a portion of my force behind to form a siege ring. My primary force can then proceed forward to the next hard point. My greatest concern with this maneuver is speed. I must fix the enemy before he can muster a counter-attack against my ringing forces. Once I have fixed the enemy armies so that they cannot move with impunity, I can rest and resupply my primary force and I will have significantly more control over the coming engagements. I do not need to besiege my enemy’s primary force; I need just to affect its movements and act accordingly.

The limiting factor of ‘ring and bypass’ is the supply line. The attack force must over-extend, temporarily sacrificing supply for speed. The more resilient and pre-provisioned the troops are, the further they can extend. The supply lines are placed in motion immediately behind the primary force and will catch up before the enemy can recover. It is a kind of military running start.

The tactic assumes that the supply caravans will be vulnerable and must be prepared to defend themselves against light attack. Guerrilla strikes on supply lines are an anticipated part of the strategy. Only major pockets of enemy resistance are ringed; small mobile clusters of resistance are left free. These small units comprise no significant threat to either the main force or the smaller ringing forces and they would be dangerously time-consuming to root out. Instead, the supply convoys travel armed and prepared for ambush, letting these pockets of opposition draw themselves out of hiding to impale themselves on the armed convoys.

The addition of air superiority to the equation exacerbates the plight of the defender. Air power can harry strong points and pinned enemy troops, bypass the enemy and reprovision the invading forces directly, protect and support the supply caravans, and overwatch and intercept the enemy if he attempts to maneuver away from a fixed position.

The logistics (both in planning and execution) of such an ambitious assault are astoundingly complex but the tactic is effective, as Patton demonstrated in his rush to Berlin during WWII. The greatest danger in such aggressive tactics is that they are unforgiving. If the enemy should break free, considerable damage can be done before sufficient force can be brought to bear. It is also the best way to defeat an overmatched foe and the fastest way to win a war because the aggressor strikes deliberately and directly at the enemy’s ‘center of gravity’.

Discerning the enemy’s center of gravity is an art in itself and the definition of what entails that center changes situationally. There is the misleading assumption that the center is synonymous with the enemy’s command or main force. The center varies based on the intent of the combatants and, as technology has developed, may exist partially outside of solely military considerations.

In each campaign, there is one key element that, when it is removed or defeated, the remainder of the force will collapse or lose its ability to fight effectively. Von Clauswitz defined it as the hub that everything revolves around. The center may be a person, a specific force, or even a symbol such as a location.

A comparison to the human body is useful, with the head, heart, and back representing various types of centers. The head may be cut off: the removal of a leader, leaders, or the ability to lead by destroying the center of command. The back may be broken: the defeat of the enemy’s primary force, usually a large and elite corps. The heart may be wrenched: capturing or destroying a key symbolic person or place that breaks morale. What these centers translate into on the field, which are relevant, and whether there are multiple centers are all delicate situational questions. The medieval King epitomizes the military center of gravity. During the American was of Northern Aggression, Lee’s army was a center for the Confederate cause. Hitler considered Paris a symbolic center of the French. In WWII, Japan felt Pearl Harbor was a center for the Pacific Theatre.

In the current war with Iraq, discernment has been made easy—Baghdad is the center of command, communication, and force concentration.